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In 1986, my brother Hubert, a professor of philosophy, and I wrote the book "Mind over Machine: The Power of 
Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer" [Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986] in which we argued that the 
brain produces skillful coping behavior in familiar types of situations by using involved intuition rather than by 
detached thinking. By "thinking" we meant the kind of reasoning, symbol-manipulating, rule-following, theory-
based procedures, etc. that we are consciously aware of as we face novel problems. Our primary goal was to argue 
that the belief held by most researchers designing expert systems at that time — that experts use reasoning and rules 
— was misguided. Our argument was phenomenological, meaning based on careful observation of both novice and 
expert naturalistic behavior. 
In chapter 6 on Managerial Art and Management Science, we applauded the construction of O.R. models of 
structured domains such as inventory control or queueing phenomena and of novel situations, but we questioned the 
advisability of developing models of unstructured situations such as business managerial or public policy issues that 
are based on the interrogation of experts about what they considered the important facts describing the situation 
(state variables), the rules by which they would change over time given decisions (dynamics), and a measure of 
quality of the resulting sequence of events (criterion). 
We also questioned the use in familiar types of situations of decision analysis requiring that experts furnish 
probabilities of events and utilities of skeletally described outcomes. We could, however, offer no convincing 
refutation of the belief prevalent in artificial intelligence research and implicitly held in operations research that, 
while experienced experts in familiar types of situations make intuitive decisions rapidly and effortlessly, they must 
be doing so by unconscious thinking, presumably based on shortcuts and rule compilations acquired during their 
experience. 
With trepidation we offered the conjecture that the intuitive brain may store a large repertoire of remembered 
situations that had been successfully handled in the past, and may somehow access one similar to the current 
situation and then use that information to produce its decisions. By 1988, when a paperback version of our book was 
published, we had learned enough about neural networks to renounce our separately remembered situation (i) view in 
favor of synaptic-based pattern discrimination and association, but we in no way anticipated the neuroscientific 
events described below. While this explanation of intuition survives today [Klein 2003], modern behavioral 
neuroscience is finding otherwise [Dreyfus 2004], and operations research has played a fundamental role in this 
conclusion. 
 
Behavioral neuroscientists 
 
 
Behavioral neuroscientists are little concerned with the biophysical and biochemical details of neural nerve cell 
behavior, the traditional domain of neuroscientific research, but rather with how neuronal activity produces thought 
and action. This research is speculative but marshals considerable brain knowledge supporting its hypotheses. A 
major tool of the behavioral neuroscientific field is brain imaging, generally using either the modern functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) or the older electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings. Information is also 
gleaned from electrode readings from the brain of performing lab animals. Furthermore, much is learned from the 
impact of damage to brain areas. Research generally involves the computational simulation of neural networks 
employing architectures consistent with what is known about connectivities among various brain areas and about 
neural activity observed in those areas under various conditions. Theories are buttressed by the ability of computational brain simulations to explain known experimental psychological data.  
We now turn to ways behavioral neuroscience and O.R. do or can inform each other. An influential group of 
behavioral neuroscientists has hypothesized that the satisfaction of Bellman's dynamic-programming equation 
expressing mathematically what he called the principle of optimality is accomplished by the brain by means of a 
successive approximation procedure. They call their use of this principle involving learning in the course of acting 
by the name temporal difference reinforcement learning (TDRL) [Dayan and Niv 2008], taking their lead from 
research in machine learning where the idea was first developed [Sutton and Barto 1998]. 
These behavioral neuroscientists refer to Bellman's optimal value function as the critic, because it assigns to each 
occurring current state the expected future reward accruable during a sequential decision process and is used during 
learning to criticize a chosen action. The brain area responsible for learning a good action or decision given the 
current state — Bellman's optimal policy function — is called the actor area. The goal of an organism is taken to be 
the maximization, or at least the successive improvement, of the expected future reward from carrying out a 
sequential behavior. Reward, it is generally agreed by neuroscientists [Montague, Hyman and Cohen 2004], is 
represented in the brain by the level of production of the neuromodulatory chemical compound dopamine and 
depends upon events and the current goal of the organism. 
This group of behavioral neuroscientists proposes that the brain, while learning a skill through many repeated trial-
and-error sequences in a domain, starts with little or no knowledge of correct actions or the expected future reward 
associated with encountered states, but simultaneously improves its estimate of each. Since the learning organism, be 
it human or lower animal, does not initially know a model of the environment (its dynamical relations etc.), many of 
these neuroscientists propose that, rather than learning a model based on observed experiences in the real world the 
way a physicist or engineer might, what needs to be learned by the brain is merely the correct critic value of various 
states and the appropriate action. This is called model-free learning. 
The learning principle of this actor-critic TDRL approach is that, given an estimate of the expected future reward of 
the current state of the organism and given an action chosen based on the current action-generating brain area, 
suppose that the environment then moves the organism to a new state for which the brain will already have an 
estimated expected future reward. Then, if (1) the immediate reward, if any, given the current transition plus the 
estimated future reward from the organism's new state exceeds (2) the estimate of the future reward of the original 
state, then the estimated reward of the original state is incrementally increased by modification of the synapses 
producing the critic's estimate. Furthermore, the synapses of the action area change to become more likely to choose 
that action again if, on a later realization of a process involving the same skill, the organism is again in the same 
state. The discrepancy between (1) above and (2) above, if one exists, is called the temporal difference error and 
drives the learning. 
Should the chosen decision produce a negative temporal difference error the expected future reward is reduced and 
the chosen action is penalized in future realizations. This process is repeated at the states encountered during future 
realizations of the same sequential skill. In order to allow the exploration required to produce an improved action, the 
chosen action is always a perturbation of what the actor area suggests. Of course, this procedure will lead, at best, to 
successive improvement of performance with no assurance of global optimality, but it is unlikely that an organism's 
learned behavior in the real world is always optimal. More often it achieves a local maximum unimprovable by small 
variations in actions (ii). 
 
Perspective Power 
 
 
These behavioral neuroscientists have furthermore conjectured, based on solid evidence, that the brain is capable of 
gating the incoming stimuli from sense organs (or presumably in some cases from an observed constellation of 
relevant information) so that the importance of different stimuli can vary depending upon circumstances. A change 
in gating is generally termed by neuroscientists a changed goal or rule [Miller and Cohen 2001], [Rougier et al. 
2005]. In my research with my brother [Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986] we, instead, used the term "perspective" to 
describe the way stimuli were salienced. Attaining the ability to skillfully cope requires that a certain brain area learn 
when a particular goal or perspective is appropriate for attaining maximal future reward and under what 
circumstances to change its goal or perspective (iii).  
We have seen, then, that model-free actor-critic TDRL based on operations research's Bellman equation together 
with learned stimuli-gating to realize perspective seems to explain what my brother and I called intuitive expertise. 
This theory leaves no need for conjecturing, as we did, the use of a library of remembered separate successful 
experiences. It explains both the speed and effortlessness of naturalistic skillful coping accomplished entirely by 
synaptic modifications to achieve learning and by spreading neural activations to produce behavior. The idea of learning when circumstances dictate a change in goal during a sequential process is beginning to 
infiltrate the machine-learning literature [Botvinick, Niv and Barto 2008], and operations research models of novel 
sequential processes could probably benefit from this same elaboration. 
But there is a far more significant byproduct of the recent brain research described above that speaks to applied 
operations researchers. Behavioral neuroscientists clearly distinguish between the network of brain areas, largely in 
the celebrated cerebral cortex with its convoluted grey matter, that collaborate to produce executive functions such as 
planning, reasoning, theorizing and rule following that are described as detached conscious thinking and a separate, 
mainly subcortical system, that, among other things, implements the actor-critic method of learning and produces 
involved, intuitive, experience-based, skillful coping behavior. Behavioral observations show that damage to the 
executive system, caused by stroke or lesion, that eliminates all of what we have called conscious thinking, fails to 
affect the execution of previously learned coping skills. For a striking example see [Sacks 2007]. 
Relating this to the modeling profession of applied operations research, the above implies that novices or experts 
facing unfamiliar situations, who typically use learned rules or reasoning implemented in cerebral cortex to figure 
out what to do, may indeed be able to reliably report to a modeler the basis of their coping behavior. Skilled 
performers, however, when facing familiar types of situations, who don't use thought but rather act intuitively based 
on synaptic modifications mainly in their subcortical brain resulting from the implementation of actor-critic learning, 
cannot be expected to reliably so report. 
Enamored, as humans tend to be, with their conscious thinking brain, most subjects, if interrogated about an act or 
choice, will probably make up some sophisticated version of the procedure they had used as novices, mistakenly 
thinking that it must be what they were subconsciously doing. This, however, when seen from the perspective of 
model-free TDRL, should not be taken as the true basis of their intuitive naturalistic skillful coping. This raises 
serious questions about models of unstructured situations based on information elicited from experienced experts 
(iv). Perhaps O.R. modeling should be trusted only in novel situations, and this includes situations where problems 
are familiar but the problem environment is novel such as during an international financial crisis where no intuitive 
experienced experts exist, or in structured situations where the states, dynamics and criterion or other model 
parameters are directly observable without consulting experts. 
It may well turn out that, while behavioral neuroscience has greatly profited from a fundamental result of operations 
research, its discoveries offer our field something of equal importance in return. To those applied operations 
researchers who, with hubris, attempt to go beyond the modeling of novel or structured operational situations and 
instead ask intuitive model-free experts in types of situations concerning unstructured management and policy 
problems with which they are familiar to articulate models that then become the basis of their computational 
recommendations, neuroscience may be offering compelling reasons for humility.  
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Notes 
 
i. Warning: In year 2000, without consulting us, a paperback edition of our 1986 
book was published. The new preface and changes we had inserted in the 1988 
paperback have consequently become history. 
ii. Shortly after the actor-critic model-free method of intuitive skill acquisition 
requiring no learning of the real-world's dynamics or other elements of a world 
model was developed in the machine-learning literature, a companion approach 
called Q-learning was introduced. It was elegantly proven, under suitable 
conditions, to lead to optimal solutions of Markovian decision processes. When the 
seminal book [Sutton and Barto 1998] on temporal difference reinforcement 
learning was produced by its developers, only three pages concerned the less 
elegant actor-critic idea. Most behavioral neuroscientists, however, seem quite 
reasonably to believe that, except when the organism must choose one of a very 
small number of discrete actions in each state, a situation rare in the real world of 
coping but common in psychological experiments and experiments requiring animal 
task learning, the computations required in Q-learning are infeasible. This certainly 
is the case where actions are chosen from a continuum of possibilities, such as the 
bodily movements of an animal chasing its prey or an athlete catching a ball. The 
activity level (firing rate) of a neuron can be any of a continuum of values, so a 
neural network is ideally suited to the production of a continuous function rather 
than a discrete-valued one. Consequently, the actor-critic version of TDRL is used 
in most behavioral neuroscientific simulations. 
iii: In imaging experiments concerned with goals and their change, the 
neuroscientific literature generally studies volitional goal changes where a subject 
is told a set of possible goals and what action each requires and, if during a session 
the experimenter changes the goal, the subject is informed that the usual action is 
now incorrect. (The Wisconsin card sort task is often used.) Figuring out a different 
goal when told an action is incorrect produces neural activity in an area of 
prefrontal cortex, and when this area is damaged, the ability appropriately to 
change goals is compromised. 
I doubt, however, if these studies of the conscious decision to change goals is 
informative concerning what brain area is involved when a coping organism, after 
considerable naturalistic learning experiences, automatically changes perspective 
when the stimuli demand it. For example, a dog, after many learning experiences, 
when chasing a squirrel will not continue to run toward it, but will veer to intercept 
it if the squirrel heads for a tree. I believe that the same can be said of the 
experienced baseball outfielder running to catch a fly ball, who certainly used his 
thinking brain when initially learning his skill. Once skilled, however, if the visual 
stimuli produced by watching the ball's overhead flight demands it, he will automatically change perspective as he suddenly turns to field the ball after it 
strikes the outfield wall. It is easy to believe that he suddenly thinks, "I'm not 
going to be able to catch it and should therefore change my goal to fielding it," but 
I doubt that this is likely or necessary, given that the dog in the first example 
doesn't have or need this thinking capacity. This leads me to suspect that the 
neuroscientists studying largely subcortically produced actor-critic TDRL behavior 
are wrong in their picture of real-world effortless and automatic skillful coping when 
they include a prefrontal cortex goal-setting area rather than an as yet 
unidentified, and likely subcortical, area. They are right, of course, for the kind of 
situations experiments currently demand. 
iv: What management consultants call experience-based tacit knowledge is 
presumably really synapse-based know how produced by the sum of one's relevant 
experiences in the way actor-critic neuroscientists speculate. It then does not take 
the form of a tacit mental model as certain management consultants are wont to 
believe [Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995], and there is no way of converting the tacit 
into the explicit. What passes for such a conversion can be no better than either 
the recitation of a few remembered experiences or else the production of a mental 
model of the sort that, according to our five-stage model of skill acquisition, 
competent performers use. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•  Table of Contents 
•  OR/MS Today Home Page 
 
 
OR/MS Today copyright © 2010 by the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. All rights 
reserved. 
 
 
Lionheart Publishing, Inc. 
506 Roswell Rd., Suite 220, Marietta, GA 30060 USA 
Phone: 770-431-0867 | Fax: 770-432-6969 
E-mail: lpi@lionhrtpub.com 
URL: http://www.lionhrtpub.com 
 
 
Web Site © Copyright 2010 by Lionheart Publishing, Inc. All rights reserved.  
 